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John H. Garvey* 
The papers in this symposium deal with two large subjects. 
The first is the breakdown of the public/private distinction. The 
second is the problems caused by this breakdown. 
I 
I will speak first about the breakdown of the public/private 
distinction. The legal name for it is the state action problem. This 
is such a common term that we sometimes forget that it is actually a 
phrase-a compound of two nouns ('state' and 'action'), like bank 
holiday, or dance card, or dog pound. I draw attention to this fact 
because we have difficulties with both parts of the phrase. Some of 
our problems center about the meaning of the word 'state.' Others 
concern the word 'action.' 
I will begin with the word 'state.' The term appears in § 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and it seems to refer to places like Ne-
braska and Utah. We also use the word to refer to nation-states, 
like the United States of America. But what exactly do we mean 
when we say that the state has acted? Suppose Nebraska passes a 
law abolishing the tort of defamation for public figures. (This gives 
speakers more protection than the First Amendment, which only 
abolishes defamation without malice.) And suppose now that the 
Omaha police chief arrests me for saying things about him that are 
nasty but true. Or suppose that a state trial court awards the chief 
damages for what I said. Who represents Nebraska in these hy-
potheticals-the legislature, or the police and the court? 
There are two good reasons for saying that the real state action 
is the action of the legislature. One is that state law makes the legis-
lature the supreme authority on most questions. The police chief 
and the court are acting illegally under Nebraska law. If we give 
Nebraska's legal system a chance to work it will ultimately repudi-
ate their actions. 
The other reason to focus on the action of the legislature is that 
the Constitution seems to require it. The First Amendment says 
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that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech." It is addressed to Congress, not the President or the 
courts. And it forbids lawmaking (the sort of thing legislatures do), 
not arrests or trials. If we extend this prohibition to the states (by 
incorporation), we should probably observe a comparable limitation 
there. 
As you know, this is the place where the state action limitation 
first broke down. In 1913 the Supreme Court held that state action 
was not limited to lawmaking; it included all kinds of acts by gov-
ernment officials, even those that violated state law.t About fifty 
years later the Court held that the federal courts had not only con-
stitutional but also statutory authority to deal with such acts. That 
is the meaning of Monroe v. Pape,2 which lets people sue for lawless 
official action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It now accounts for a large 
percentage of the business of the federal courts.3 Richard Kay ar-
gues that the first of these decisions was a mistake-that the Consti-
tution should limit only acts of lawmaking (and official action 
carrying out contestable laws).4 
I said that the idea of state action has been expanded along two 
axes. One is the meaning of the word 'state.' The other is the 
meaning of the word 'action.' Here I want to mention two influen-
tial theories for stretching in this direction. There are more, and 
these two may actually collapse into one, but for our purposes I will 
focus on just these two and treat them separately. 
The first theory argues that the idea of state action also encom-
passes state inaction: sometimes we can hold the state responsible 
when it appears to be doing nothing. I will call this the permission 
theory. It reminds me of scholastic brain-teasers about the omnipo-
tence of God. If God is omnipotent, how can we explain the pres-
ence of evil in the world? What makes the question hard is the 
implicit assumption that God is morally responsible for allowing 
things to happen that he has the power to prevent. According to 
the permission theory the state is like God. It is practically om-
nipotent; there are very few things it can't forbid. To take an obvi-
ous example, it could (if it wanted to) outlaw most kinds of private 
discrimination. If it fails to do this, it is morally responsible when 
1. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). 
2. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
3. Peter W. Low & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Civil Rights Actions 16 & note g (Founda-
tion Press, 1988). 
4. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 Const. Comm. 331, 344-51 (1993). Kay includes in 
the category 'lawmaking' not only statutes, but also common law-making by courts and exec-
utive law-making in areas where the Constitution gives the executive (the President or com-
parable state officials) that authority. 
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bad things happen. Consider also the case of Joshua DeShaney.s 
He lived with his father after his parents divorced, and over a pe-
riod of four years his father beat him senseless. The Wisconsin so-
cial welfare bureaucracy observed all this going on but did nothing 
to stop it-though it had ample legal power to do so. It is morally 
responsible for permitting this brutality to go on, like Kitty Geno-
vese's neighbors, or like God. 
You will see a discussion of the permission theory in several of 
the papers in this symposium. Larry Alexander and Michael Seid-
man find it persuasive. 6 Richard Kay argues against the permission 
theory. He thinks that we can distinguish between actions and 
omissions. (We do it all the time in criminal law and torts.) And he 
says that we should not hold the state responsible for the mere fail-
ure to act.7 
The permission theory holds that we have state action when 
the state sits idly by and lets bad things happen. The second theory 
argues that the state is actively involved in (almost) all private ac-
tion, but at such a deep level that we tend to overlook it. I will call 
this (sticking with my theological metaphors) the prime mover the-
ory. Consider again the case of Joshua DeShaney. We think it 
rather natural that he was living with his father. But that was in 
fact the result of a state court decision awarding the father custody 
after a divorce. The first cause of Joshua's predicament was the 
state, which delivered him up to a brutal custodian.s Or consider 
the case of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks.9 The question was whether 
there was state action when a warehouseman engaged in self-help 
and sold a bailor's goods to cover his charges. Such a sale could 
only take place in a legal system with property and contract rules. 
In New York, where this case happened, those rules allowed Flagg 
Brothers to pass good title and prevented Brooks from interfering 
with the sale.w You will see the prime mover theory discussed also 
in several of these papers-Kay's and Seidman's in particular. 
To recapitulate very briefly: the border between private action 
5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
6. Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Pri-
vate Power, 10 Const. Comm. 363 (1993); Louis M. Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 
Const. Comm. 381 (I 993). 
7. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 348-60 (cited in note 4). 
8. Seidman, 10 Const. Comm. at 389 (cited in note 6). 
9. 436 u.s. 149 (1978). 
10. Alexander, 10 Const. Comm. at 365-66 (cited in note 6). Brooks also relied on the 
permission theory, because New York had a law (Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210) al-
lowing a warehouseman to satisfy a lien on goods in his possession by selling the goods. The 
Court rejected this argument. It held that § 7-210 merely embodied (in statutory form) the 
state's decision not to act, and states were not responsible for inaction. 
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and public (state) action is no longer a clear one, because state ac-
tion has spread out so far in two directions. First, the idea of the 
'state' is larger than it used to be. It includes not just lawmakers 
but all public officials, even ones who are acting lawlessly. Second, 
the meaning of the word 'action' has also been enlarged. It can 
include inaction as well (the permission theory), because the state 
may be responsible for failing to prevent harm. And it is present in 
the background of every case (the prime mover theory) where pri-
vate actors rely on the legal system to order their affairs. 
II 
I now want to say a few words about the problems caused by 
the breakdown of the public/private distinction. These papers sug-
gest three such problems, though whether they actually are 
problems, and whether these costs outweigh the benefits of abolish-
ing the distinction, are disputed questions. 
The first problem is that there is an economy of restraint, and 
the breakdown makes the Constitution a less effective restraint on 
government. Those who make this argument begin with the as-
sumption that the power of the government is qualitatively different 
from the power of any other social institution: it is "the only actor 
not subject to regulation by ordinary law."u All the other (private) 
centers of power--defense contractors, public utilities, pension 
funds, churches, Madison Avenue-are (putting the Constitution to 
one side for a moment) subordinate to the lawmaking power of the 
state. The Constitution thus performs the special function of pro-
viding "a law for the lawmaker."12 
Now it is a fact well known to football fans that if you string 
your defense out along the line of scrimmage you open yourself up 
to runs up the middle, where you have no depth. A defense only 
has eleven players, and it's important to position them so as to get 
the maximum effect. The more ground you try to cover, the less 
protection you will get within the covered area. People sometimes 
make this argument about the scope of rights protected by the Con-
stitution. If we apply the same rules to advertising and pornogra-
phy as we do to political speech, there is a danger that we will 
weaken the freedom of speech in cases where it really matters. 13 If 
we extend the freedom of religion to cover all claims of conscience, 
II. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 354 (cited in note 4). 
12. ld. at 355. 
13. John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment: A Reader 148 (West 
Pub. Co., 1992); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1981). 
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we will get so many requests for exemptions that the laws will be-
come unenforceable. Then the only way to prevent anarchy will be 
to weaken the protection of the Free Exercise Clause-to say that it 
is subordinate to the everyday concerns of government. The safer 
thing to do in each case is to put more protection in the middle (use 
linebackers and a secondary) so you can stop the plays that really 
matter. 
We can make the same kind of argument about the public/ 
private distinction. The more actors the Constitution has to defend 
us against, the less protection it will give us in cases that really mat-
ter. If the same rules that cover the state of Nebraska are applied to 
the Garvey family and the Home Dairy, we will have to start weigh-
ing interests and making exceptions. Or to put it in legal jargon, we 
will have to engage in a lot of ad hoc balancing. The end result will 
be that we get less protection where we really need it. Better to 
limit private power by passing laws, and save the Constitution to 
check the lawmakers. 
Richard Kay relies on the economy of restraint as a reason for 
saving the public/private distinction.I4 Larry Alexander disagrees. 
He argues that if we look hard enough we will find state action in 
every case. But this does not mean that the Constitution requires 
families, farms and pension funds to behave as Nebraska must. 
There are special reasons for allowing private choices-even choices 
that states themselves could not make-and these will often tip the 
balance against regulation.Is Implicit in Alexander's argument is 
the assumption (which Kay disputes) that courts can do this kind of 
balancing without jeopardizing the rule of law. 
Let me turn now to a second problem caused by the break-
down of the public/private distinction, which I will call the threat 
to private rights. There are always two parties in state action cases, 
and we are tempted to invoke the Constitution because one of them 
is a bad guy. Randy, let us say, is mistreating Jane. If we can show 
that Randy is a public actor, we can apply the Due Process Clause 
to their relationship and right this wrong. But we may catch Jane 
in the same net we throw over Randy. 
Suppose that she is Jane Roe. The right to make choices about 
reproduction assumes that there is a public/private distinction; we 
call the right a right of privacy. Roe v. Wade holds that "there is a 
sphere of privacy within which each woman has a right [free from 
state interference] to decide for herself whether she ought to have 
14. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 341-43 (cited in note 4). 
15. Alexander, 10 Const. Comm. at 367-68, 374 (cited in note 6). 
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an abortion."I6 But if there is no sphere of privacy for Randy, there 
will be none for Jane either. As Michael Seidman shows, we could 
make the same arguments for finding the state behind Jane's actions 
as we would for Randy: the state determined her choice by refusing 
to provide health benefits for pregnant mothers and child services 
for new infants. 11 
We could extend this point in various directions. Many people 
argue that the foundation of free speech is the individual interest in 
self-rule or self-expression. Is These ideas, like the right of privacy, 
make no sense unless there is a private realm within which a person 
can make her own choices and determine the direction of her own 
life. If everything we think and do is state action, the freedom of 
speech rests on an illusion. 
Or, to take another example, consider the case of religious free-
dom. Law schools usually teach that religion is a private matter. 
The Establishment Clause is designed to keep it out of public life; 
the Free Exercise Clause protects it within the private sphere. But 
if everything is public there is no work for the Free Exercise Clause 
to do; indeed, it may even be that the Establishment Clause applies 
to the affairs of the Catholic Church. 
This is a high price to pay to keep Randy from abusing Jane. 
Akhil Amar proposes a lower-cost solution. He argues that some 
private actions, like child abuse, are forbidden by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.I9 This solution does not deny that there are private 
actions. Nor does it deny that many of them are beyond the reach 
of the Constitution. It only says that some parts of the Constitution 
apply directly to private behavior (a point no one disputes), and 
then makes a (more controversial) claim about what types of behav-
ior are covered. 
Let me tum now to the last of the problems associated with the 
breakdown of the public/private distinction. I will call this an ideo-
logical problem, for reasons that I think will be obvious. For the 
first decade after Brown v. Board of Education, before Congress got 
involved by enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the courts were the 
only place plaintiffs could go to enforce the principle of racial equal-
16. Seidman, 10 Const. Cornrn. at 395 (cited in note 6). 
17. I d. at 395-96. 
18. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Val;Je of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982); 
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974). 
19. Akhil Reed Arnar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 Const. Cornrn. 405 (1993); see also 
Akhil Reed Arnar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992). 
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ity. And in the absence of federal statutory commands the only 
justification for interfering in state affairs was proof that existing 
social practices violated the Equal Protection Clause. The state and 
federal legislatures were not just idle, but institutionally incapable 
of acting. State legislatures in the south (and the north) were 
malapportioned and constituted in a way that represented the ex-
isting segregated social structure. Congress's own internal prac-
tices, in particular the committee structure and the filibuster, 
inhibited it from passing laws to deal with voting, housing, schools, 
employment, public accommodations, and so forth. So it is no sur-
prise that the classical texts on the problem of state action are cases 
dealing with race relations: Shelley v. Kraemer,2o the Girard College 
Case,21 Evans v. Newton,22 and Evans v. Abney,23 Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority,24 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,2s Reit-
man v. Mulkey,26 and the White Primary Cases.21 Given these 
circumstances it is no wonder that, as David Strauss says, the state 
action doctrine was seen as "the enemy."2s The federal courts were 
on the side of the angels, and any legal barrier that kept them from 
getting involved in the cause of reform had to be knocked down. 
Today, Strauss argues, there may be better ways of solving the 
kinds of problems he is concerned about: hate speech and pornogra-
phy, affirmative action, election finance, integration maintenance. 
It is not always clear which side of these problems the good guys are 
on. We need to experiment with different solutions. But constitu-
tional remedies, which are what the courts give us, are by nature 
uniform and inflexible. Legislative solutions, on the other hand, can 
be different in different jurisdictions, and tailored to fit the shape of 
the body politic. What's more, Strauss asserts, we are more likely 
to get action out of our legislatures on these issues, because they are 
no longer immobilized by the kind of institutional gridlock that we 
had in the era of Jim Crow. For purposes of our discussion, this 
means that we should not strain to find state action at every tum. It 
20. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
21. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). See also 
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968). 
22. 382 u.s. 296 (1966). 
23. 396 u.s. 435 (1970). 
24. 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
25. 407 u.s. 163 (1972). 
26. 387 u.s. 369 (1967). 
27. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
28. David Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 Const. Comm. 413, 418 
(1993). 
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will be all right, indeed it may be better, if we preserve some rem-
nant of the public/private distinction. 
I have called this problem ideological because it puts the pub-
lic/private distinction at the service of political goals. For Strauss 
the state action doctrine seems not to have any independent signifi-
cance. We should find state action, or not, depending on which 
answer will better serve the ends of justice. 
Edwin Baker has given us a wonderful illustration of how legis-
lative solutions (the kind Strauss prefers) can advance constitutional 
ends in the post-civil rights era.29 Baker argues that the most po-
tent and pernicious censor of content in the media today is not the 
government but advertisers. One way to deal with this problem 
would be to show that commercial censorship was not private but 
public action, and let the courts impose First Amendment restric-
tions. Baker takes a more Straussian approach. He concedes that 
advertisers exercise private power, and argues for a legislative solu-
tion. He proposes a tax on advertising and a subsidy for readers-a 
remedy that the courts would be institutionally incapable of 
providing. 
If I may recapitulate once more: we hear today three kinds of 
reasons for preserving the public/private distinction. One (the 
economy of restraint) is that we need it to make the Constitution an 
effective restraint on government. A second (the threat to private 
rights) is that we cannot control bad private actors without also 
controlling good ones. If we abolish the notion of privacy to get at 
child abuse, we may also break down the barrier that protects re-
productive freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so 
on. Third (the ideological problem), those who want to abolish the 
public/private distinction for political reasons-to let progressive 
courts solve social problems-may find that they can get better re-
lief for today's problems from other branches of government. I 
should add that there is considerable disagreement about these so-
called problems: many find them untroubling, or even incoherent. 
But the papers in this symposium offer a much-needed discussion of 
all these issues. 
29. C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 Const. Comm. 
425 (1993); see also C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2097 (1992). 
